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INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals with security
interests in personal property. It would supersede the present Ohio
statutes on chattel mortgages, conditional sales, factor's liens, crop
mortgages, railroad equipment mortgages, trust receipts, and assign-
ment of accounts receivable;' and it would affect present Ohio
practices in connection with consignments, bailment leases, and
field warehousing. It would also affect certain aspects of the pres-
ent Ohio Sales Act, Bills of Lading Act, Warehouse Receipts Act,
Bulk Sales Act, Small Loan Act, and Retail Installment Sales Act.2
The adoption by Ohio of Article 9 (officially cited as "Uniform
Commercial Code - Secured Transactions") obviously would make
major changes in existing Ohio law.
This paper will compare in some detail Article 9 with present
Ohio law relating to security interests in three subclassifications of
intangible personal property (i. e., accounts, contract rights, and
chattel paper). A detailed discussion of security interests in the
other two subclassifications of intangible personal property (i. e.,
documents of title and instruments) and in four subclassifications
of tangible personal property (i.e., goods, including inventory,
equipment, consumer goods, and farm products) will appear in a
later issue of this Journal. Some general comments on the over-all
scheme of Article 9 are, however, a necessary preliminary to the
detailed discussion.
Many readers will have already noticed in the preceding para-
graphs that Article 9 will introduce new words into their legal vo-
cabularies. A deliberate attempt has been made to label fresh
* Of the firm of Mooney, Hahn, Loeser, Keough & Freedheim, Cleveland,
Ohio.
I Respectively, Omo Gmx. CODE § 8560 et seq.; § 8568 et seq.; § 8364-1
et seq.; § 8567-1 & -2; § 8623-75; §8568; and § 8509-3 et seq. For discussion
of common law merchant factor's liens see Cameron, Factor's Liens in Ohio,
XXIII Omao BAR 361, 362 (1950).
2 Respectively, Oao GEN. CODE § 8381 et seq.; § 8993-1 et seq.; § 8457
et seq.; § 11102 et seq.; § 6346-12 et seq.; and § 6346-15. Article 6 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, entitled "Bulk Transfers," would, if adopted,
supersede the present bulk sales act.
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concepts with terminology unknown to the present legal diction-
aries. It is intended thereby to require Article 9 to be interpreted
and applied by reference to the Rules of Construction for the whole
Code stated in Sec. 1-102.3 The scrap heap of judicial definitions col-
lected in such compendia as "Words and Phrases" is intended to be
made irrelevant.
mustration "A" shows the classifications of personal property
used in Article 9. The major distinction is between (a) goods, which
NOT EVio ' -
(O) GOODS (b)INTANGIBLt PROPERTY
CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY USED INARTICLE 9
ILLUSTRATION "A"
"... includes all things which are movable... " except money and
intangibles,4 and (b) the two classes of intangible personal property.
The first class of intangibles includes those which are customarily
evidenced by a writing and transferred by delivery of the writing
(documents of title, instruments and chattel paper);5 the second
class includes those customarily not evidenced by a writing (ac-
3 These rules direct that the Uniform Commercial Code be liberally
construed in order to promote a simple, flexible and uniform commercial law.
4U.C.C. § 9-105 (1) (f).
S Definitions of the subclassifications comprising this first class will be
found in U.C.C. § 9-105 (b), (e) and (g).
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counts and contract rights).6 Compensation due to an employee
and judgments, both of which fit within the broad description of
the second class of intangibles, are specifically excluded from that
class by Sec. 9-106.
MAJOR POLICIES OF ARTICLE 9
There are nine subclassifications of personal property recog-
nized by Article 9. The substantive rights of certain parties will
sometimes vary with the subclassification of personal property in-
volved, but the formal requirements of Article 9 for the attachment
and perfection of any security interest in any property are uniform.
Fine distinctions between chattel mortgages and conditional sales
will no longer be of concern,7 and generally, in connection with
security interests, the location of title will be immaterial. The
lender or vendor who desires a security interest will prepare the
same simple "security agreement" for any transaction covered by
Article 9. He will need neither a lawyer to warn him of intricate
formal snares nor a notary to perform superfluous ceremonies. If he
wishes to use any of the old forms he may, but all he really will re-
quire is a writing which contains a reasonable description of the per-
sonal property in which a security interest is claimed, the signatures
of the debtor and of the secured party, and their respective ad-
dresses.8 The recorder will not maintain several separate indices all
of which must be searched in checking title to personal property.9
6 Definitions of the subclassifications comprising this second class will
be found in U.C.C. § 9-106.
7 When a chattel mortgagee under present Ohio law attempts after default
to gain possession of the mortgaged property he may be met with the claim
that the security transaction was really a conditional sale and that there-
fore he is not entitled to possession until after a tender back of part of the
purchase price. See, e.g., Bellish v. C.I.T. Corp., 142 Ohio St. 36 (1943) (4 to
2 opinion on whether the form of a certain transaction as a matter of law
made it a conditional sale instead of a chattel mortgage). This is not a recent
problem. Compare comment of the senior author of this paper when a
junior in law school: "The various forms of sale of chattels on credit all
have a common purpose-easier payment for the buyer with sufficient
security for the seller .... Despite this simple underlying purpose the law
regarding such contracts has grown complex. This is shown by attempts to
distinguish between a conditional sale and a chattel mortgage." 36 HARv. L.
REv. 740 (1922).
8 An oral agreement is sufficient if the secured party has possession of
the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (a).
9 On an informal basis this has already been accomplished in Cuyahoga
County where the Recorder maintains a single consolidated card index for
chattel mortgages (filed or recorded), conditional sales, factors, liens, notices
of assignment of accounts receivable, attested accounts, and Industrial Com-
mission liens under Osro GENr. CODE § 1465-74a. He also maintains three
separate indices, duplicating entries in the consolidated index, for recorded
chattel mortgages, factor's liens and notices of assignment of accounts re-
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This is the first major policy of Article 9-to make the formal
requirements of obtaining all security interests in personalty simple
and uniform so that legal consequences will not turn on distinctions
based on form or title.
A second major policy is to facilitate the creation of secured
interests in personal property. Article 9 approves the after-acquired
property clause 10 and the future advances clause." It adopts notice
filing as opposed to requiring a detailed description of each item
of collateral.12 It eliminates the need for a secured party to police
the operations of the debtor as required by Benedict v. Ratner, 268
U. S. 353 (1935), and the subsequent cases which voided security
arrangements if the borrower had much control' over the col-
lateral. 13 These four steps make possible the creation of a so-called
"floating lien"- a security interest in a single res which consists
of the whole inventory as it may exist from time to time. The
legal unit to be pledged then becomes "stock in trade," "work in
process," or "book account" - not the underlying component items
in inventory at a given moment or the specific accounts receivable
then on the books. By the use of field warehousing14 a shifting
stock of inventory can be securely pledged in Ohio today, and under
the present Ohio statute a floating lien on certain future accounts
is possible; so Article 9 will not introduce this form of secured
financing into wholly new fields. But it will simplify and make
more secure the lien on many types of short-lived collateral, and
thereby, of course, reduce the cost to borrowers of many forms
of secured credit.'5
ceivable. Other personal property liens may be found in the separate
indices to unemployment compensation liens [OHio GEN. CODE § 1345-4(a) (4)]
and Federal tax liens (INT. REV. CODE § 3670 et seq. and OGio GEN. CODE
§ 2757-1).
10 U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
11 UC.C. § 9-204(5).
12U.C.C. § 9-402.
1 U.C.C. § 9-205. For a good review of the Benedict v. Ratner doctrine
see Note-Accounts Receivable Financing-Limitations upon Control By Bor-
rower, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 598 (1949).
14 To establish a field warehouse, the debtor leases a portion of his
premises to a warehouse company. That company takes possession on the
leased premises of some part of the debtor's inventory and issues warehouse
receipts which can be used as bank collateral. Typically the field ware-
house company merely hires as its supervisor of the inventory an employee
of the debtor. See Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 CoL. L. REv. 991 (1942);
Birnbaum, Form and Substance in Field Warehousing, 13 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROD. 579 (1948).
1SAfter the Ohio statute was revised to permit floating liens on accounts
receivable, one borrowing arrangement known to the authors was reset to
eliminate the paper work incidental to a non-floating lien on short-lived
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It is here that the major economic struggle occurred in the
deliberations of the American Law Institute and is likely to recur
in the Ohio Legislature. Spokesmen for the unsecured creditors
(chiefly the credit men and commercial lawyers, who represent the
trade creditors selling on open account) are well accustomed to
mortgaged real estate. They still look askance at pledged accounts
and field warehoused inventory, and they freely predict dire con-
sequences from floating liens to which all inventory, all receivables,
and even some of the cash might be subject. Some suggest that
manufacturers, wholesalers, and other sellers might have to adopt
cash, C.O.D., or sight draft credit policies if their customers quite
generally began creating floating liens on their current assets in
favor of banks and commercial credit companies.1 6 The answer
of the supporters of Article 9 is that "Hostility to secured credit
does not prevent such credit from being extended, but serves only
to make it more expensive."' 7 They point to the economic waste in-
volved in the expense of operating complicated credit procedures
and in the higher interest which must be charged to offset the oc-
casional loss of' security when a slip occurs in those complicated
procedures.
The Ohio State Bar Association has endorsed all of Article 9
except the filing provisions.'8 County seat rather than state capital
accounts. Although the interest rate was reduced from 6% to 4/%, the
lender reports a higher net profit. The borrower reports an even greater
dollar saving on clerical cost than on reduced interest.
16 See discussion of economic policy issues by one of the draftsmen of
Article 9 in Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARv.
L. REv. 588 (1949) particularly at p. 613 ff.
1 Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security,
1952 Wis. L. REv. 348, 353 (1952).
Is The Committee on Banking and Commercial Law in a report to the
May 15, 1952, Meeting of the Council of Delegates, stated: "The committee
recommends that after it is adopted by New York State and two or three
other states, it should be adopted by the Ohio Legislature with the following
exceptions:
1. The Metzenbaum Act, relating to installment sales, should be re-
tained, and if there are any provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
in conflict with it, they should not be adopted.
2. The present provisions of the Ohio Code with respect to filing in
order to protect a security interest should be retained in principle, and
any provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in substantial conflict
therewith should not be adopted. (There may be an exception made in
the case of consumer goods sold at retail.)
3. The committee reserves judgment on whether Article 6, relating to
Bulk Sales, should be adopted in place of the present Bulk Sales Act.
It will have a recommendation to make later on this subject."
This report was held over at the request of the chairman and at the November
1, 1952, Meeting of the Council of Delegates a revised report was approved
which recommended "that it be passed by the Ohio legislature after New York
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filing is favored by the Association. The field warehousing interests
in Ohio, although they will still have collateral control if not legal
security services to sell, are, of course, vigorously opposed to Ar-
ticle 9.19 The credit men and the collection bar have indicated they
will oppose it. The authors of the present paper are members both
of the American Law Institute and of the Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation. Their endorsement of the Association's position is there-
fore perhaps doubly suspect. They submit, however, that a care-
ful comparison of the impact of Article 9 on the present Ohio Law
relating to security interests in intangible property will show (a)
few material changes except in connection with chattel paper and
(b) quite good reasons for adopting most of these changes.
ACCOUNTS AND CONTRACT RIGHTS
Let us first compare the present Ohio law relating to security
interests in accounts and contract rights20 with the relevant pro-
visions of Article 9. The 1951 revision of the Ohio Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Act was primarily intended to overrule Wells
v Place, 95 Fed. Supp. 474 (E.D. Ohio 1950), 58 Ohio L.Abs. 582,
which had construed the 1941 Ohio Assignment of Accounts Re-
ceivable Act to mean that general creditors could not avoid an
assignment in which the assignee and the subsequently bankrupt
assignor had failed to comply with the recording provisions of that
Act.21 Combined with the 1950 amendment of Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act,22 the Wells v. Place holding permitted an assignee
who had neglected to record his assignment under the former Ohio
statute nevertheless to prevail over the trustee of his bankrupt
assignor- either under Section 60 or under Section 70 (e). Thus
and at least one or two of the larger commercial states have adopted it. Your
committee has some reservation as to the adoption of parts relating to Bulk
Sales and some of the provisions for recording that may be contrary to the
policy adopted by the Ohio legislature, but it will, if you approve, make its
recommendation to the legislature with respect thereto at the appropriate
time."
19Based on recent interviews with persons engaged in Ohio field ware-
housing operations, the authors estimate that there are currently about 250
field warehouses in Ohio containing about $20,000,000.00 of material.
20The Ohio Assignment of Accounts Receivable Statute as revised in
1951 is briefly discussed in Folkerth, Accounts Receivable Legislation, 12 OQio
STATE L. J. 333 (1952).
21 A "clearly erroneous interpretation." Folkerth, supra, 335.
22 Section 60 was substantially rewritten and the bankruptcy trustee was
reduced to the position of a lien creditor (from his former position of a
bona fide purchaser) in testing whether transfers by the bankrupt could be
voided as preferences. See Sell, Preferential Transfers for Security Under
Section 60 of The Bankruptcy Act, 12 U. or PrrT. L. REV. 173 (1951) for a
complete history of Section 60; and see Kupfer, The Recent Amendment to
the Preference Section of the Bankruptcy Act, 22 N.Y. STATE BAR AssN. Bun.
329 (1950) for a particularly good concise summary of same.
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the recordation required by the 1941 Ohio Act became irrelevant
in bankruptcy and was of significance only in the rare instances
where a dishonest assignor assigned the same accounts receivable
to more than one assignee.
The Ohio Banker's Association, which had sponsored the 1941
Ohio statute, employed a draftsman and directed him to make
a thorough study of the statutes of other states and, in particular,
of the Uniform Commercial Code (then in tentative draft). The
Committee assigned to work with the draftsman adopted the posi-
tion of the Commercial Code whenever a choice of positions seemed
fairly even. As a result, the 1951 version of the Ohio Assignment
of Accounts Receivable Act brought Ohio law in this area into
quite substantial conformity with what is proposed by the Uni-
form Commercial Code. We shall compare the tvo statutes in
respect to: Transactions Covered, Filing Provisions, Rights Given
to Assignee, and Procedure upon Default.
TRANSACTIONS COVERED
The security interests in accounts receivable covered by the
present Ohio statute are substantially the same as those within
the scope of Article 9. Noteworthy differences can best be shown
by reviewing the eleven tests which a given transaction must meet
before it comes within the scope of the present Ohio statute.23
The first seven of these tests look to the nature of the property in-
volved, and the last four tests look to the nature of the transaction
involved.
(1) The Ohio statute limits its definition of an account
receivable to a "right to the payment of money." The
Code omits the final two words in its definition of
account and contract right.24 Exchange transactions
which fall outside the scope of the Ohio statute would
therefore be covered by the Code, and there is no rea-
son why such non-monetary obligations should not be
transferable as security.
(2) In parallel language, the Ohio statute and the Code
limit the accounts within their scope to those "for
goods sold or leased or for services rendered. '25 Thus
23 Transactions beyond the scope of the statute would be under the Ohio
common law, and it is an open question whether between two successive as-
signees the first in time of assignment or the first to notify the debtor would
prevail. Compare Gamble v. Carlisle, 3 Ohio N.P. 279, 282, 6 Ohio Dec. (N.P.)
48 (Sup. Ct. of Cin. 1898) and Ohio Annotations to RESTATEEMNT, CONTRACTS
§ 173 (1933) with General Excavator Co. v. Judkins, 128 Ohio St. 160, 166, 190
N.E. 389, 392 (1934). See summary of Ohio case law in Hamilton, Assign-
ments of Accounts Receivable Under the Chandler Act, 14 Ohio Ops. 168
(1939).
24 0mo Gmr. CODE § 8509-3 (1) and U.C.C. § 9-306 (3).
2 5 Omo GEN. CODE § 8509-3 (1) and U.C.C. § 9-106.
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both exclude accounts arising from the sale or lease
of real estate, from cash loans and cash deposits,
from the maturity of insurance policies, etc. The in-
tention in each instance was to limit the statute to
commercial current assets financing.
(3) The Ohio statute includes in its definition of an ac-
count receivable "both an existing right to immediate
or future payment and a right to payment which may
arise under an existing contract" The former is the
definition of an "account" and the latter is substan-
tially the definition of a "contract right" under the
Code. 26 Neither the Ohio statute nor the Code in-
cludes in its concept of presently assignable rights a
right which may arise under a contract which has yet
to be made.
(4) Both the Ohio statute and the Code exclude accounts
receivable which prior to assignment have been sued
upon and a judgment obtained.27 One should note
that judgments obtained subsequent to assignment
become "proceeds" of the account and belong to the
assignee.28(5) Both the Ohio statute and the Code exclude accounts
evidenced by a negotiable instrument,29 for transfer
of such accounts falls under the law of negotiable
instruments.
(6) The Code excludes accounts evidenced by chattel pa-
per. The Ohio statute excludes accounts evidenced
by "a duly filed or recorded instrument... of chattel
mortgage or conditional sale."30 Thus accounts rep-
resented by unfiled and unrecorded chattel mortgages
or conditional sales contracts can be assigned under
Ohio law as accounts receivable. This is discussed be-
low in comparing the treatment of chattel paper un-
der the Code with present Ohio law.(7) Both the Code and the Ohio statute adopt the conflict
of laws rule that the location of the assignor deter-
mines the applicable law. In the case of an assignor
with multi-state operations, both look to the state
where the assignor keeps his primary bookkeeping
record for the particular account.3 1 There are five
possible determinants of the state law to govern an
account receivable assignment: the locations of (1)
the debtor, of (2) the creditor-assignor or of (3) the
2 6 OHio GE. CODE § 8509-3 (1) and U.C.C. § 9-106.
27 Omo GEN. CODE § 8509-3 (b) (1) and U.C.C. § 9-106. Since the intent
is to recognize the extinguishment of the account by merger into judgment,
no doubt only prior personal judgments are excluded. A judgment in rem or
quasi in rem does not extinguish the unpaid balance of the account; it is mere-
ly satisfaction of part of the account. See Saunders v. King § 69 Ohio App. 313,
37 N.E. 2d 92 (1941).2 8 OHio GEN. CODE § 8509-3 (a) and 6 (5) and U.C.C. § 9-306 (1).
2 9 OHrO GEN. CODE § 8509-3 (b) (2) and U.C.C. § 9-106.
3 0 OHrO GEu. CODE § 8509-3 (b) (3) and U.C.C. § 9-106.
31 OHIO GEN. CODE § 8509-4 and U.C.C. § 9-103 (1).
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assignee and the location where the contract of as-
signment is (4) made or (5) to be performed. It is
the assignor's creditors who should be able to locate
any public recordings related to the assignment, and
so only the location of the assignor is a feasible de-
terminant.32 Neither the Ohio statute nor the Code
permits the parties to contract for a different ap-
plicable law,s3 since it is the third party creditors
whose rights are to be protected.
(8) Both the Code and the Ohio statute exclude reassign-
ments by assignees in the financing business. 34 This
permits a bank to reassign participating interests in
a large loan without filing. Unlike primary assign-
ments, reassignments are usually to several assignees
and the reassigning bank may have a different group
of participants for each loan. Thus the filing tech-
niques used for primary assignments are inappro-
priate.
(9) The Ohio statute excludes "transfers by operation of
law." The Code by covering only "any transaction...
intended to create a security interest in personal prop-
erty" and "any financing sale of accounts" excludes
transfers by law as well as gifts, transfers of a contract
right to an assignee who is also to do the performance
under the contract, etc.3S This is an improvement on
the Ohio statute which invalidates for failure to file
some non-commercial assignments which the parties
might never expect to be covered.
(10) Both the Code and the Ohio statute exclude certain
accounts the assignment of which is subject to spe-
cial federal or state law.36 Thus neither statute af-
fects the Ohio automobile lien system of notation on
the certificate of title. The assignment of claims
against the federal government, regulated by the Fed-
eral Assignment of Claims Act, need not now be filed
in Ohio, but, because of a difference in wording, fil-
ing is required under the Code. The federal statute
permits assignment only to certain lenders and also
provides for notice to contracting and disbursing of-
3 2 See Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code,
16 LAw & CoiErmp. PRoBs. 27, 33 ff. (1951).
33 U.C.C. § 1-105 (6) as limited by U.C.C. § 1-102 (3) (b). The Ohio
statute does not make any provision for choice of law by the parties. See
Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAw & CoNTnmp. PRoD. 49 (1951).
34 O rro Gmw. CODE § 8509-4 and U.C.C. § 9-302 (1) (f).
3S Omo GEx. CODE § 8509-3 (3) and U.C.C. § 9-102 (1) (a) and (b).
3 6 OHO GEN. CODE § 8509-3 (1) (b) and U.C.C. 59-104 (a) (exclusion from
coverage) and -302 (2) (a) (exclusion from filing provisions). Nautical fi-
nancing is excluded under U.C.C. § 9-104 (a) because of the Ship Mortgage
Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 911 ff. Under U.C.C. § 9-302 (2) (a) aeronautical fi-
nancing is excluded because of the airplane lien provisions of the Civil
Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. § 523, and railroad equipment financing is excluded
because of the recordation provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 20c. All three types of fi-
nancing are excluded under Omo Gs_. CODE § 8509-3 (1) (b).
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ficers and to sureties on bonds.37 There seems to be
little point in requiring by state law a further notice
to the public. Wage claims are excluded by both
statutes, under Ohio law because there are applicable
state statutes and under the Code by express pro-
vision.38
(11) The Code excludes "a transfer of accounts as part of
a sale of the business out of which they arose," while
the Ohio statute recognizes this exclusion only if the
requirements of the Bulk Sales Law are met.39 The
Code's provision is probably the better one. If the
Bulk Sales Law is applicable and not followed, ade-
quate remedies are provided by that law. If the Bulk
Sales Law is not applicable to the entire sale, there is
no reason to single the accounts receivable out for
special treatment.
There are three additional exclusions from the Code's filing
requirements not provided by the Ohio statute: (1) assignments
which do not represent a significant part of the assignor's out-
standing accounts or contract rights, (2) assignments for collection
only, and (3) the further assignment of a perfected security in-
terest.40 The first of these exclusions intends to exclude the casual
or isolated transaction; it was not incorporated into the Ohio statute
because it was felt that the invalidation of such a transaction was
better than litigation to determine whether a given assignment was
"a significant part" of the book account. The second exclusion is
unnecessary in that an assignee for collection must, of course, re-
turn the proceeds collected on the account to the assignor. The
third exclusion largely duplicates the exclusion discussed under
(8) above.
In summary, the Code and the present Ohio statute are al-
most conterminous in their coverage of accounts receivable trans-
actions. The only difference between the two which should not
unquestionably yield to the very important consideration of achiev-
ing uniformity among the various states is the coverage of claims
against the federal government. It is known that all the principal
advisors on the drafting of Article 9 did not realize that the ex-
clusions of Section 9-104 (a) and -302 (2) (a) were drawn so nar-
rowly as to leave these claims covered. The Ohio Legislature might
well invite testimony on this problem by federal contracting of-
ficers, bankers, and interstate uniformity zealots.
FILING PROVISIONS
The basic technique of Article 9 is "notice filing" which re-
quires public filing of a simple notice to indicate that a specified per-
37 31 U.S.C. § 203.38 Omo Gzx. CoDE § 6346-12 et seq, and U.C.C. § 9-106.
39 Omo GEN. CoDE § 8509-4 and U.C.C. § 9-104 (f).40U.C.C. § 9-302 (1) (e) and (2).
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son may have a security interest in some of the property of an-
other specified person.41 The public records, then, do not as under
the present chattel mortgage act show particular items of property
subject to a security interest. Notice filing was first introduced in-
to accounts receivable legislation by the 1941 Ohio statute, and sev-
enteen other states subsequently adopted the same principle in
their accounts receivable statutes.42 The filing provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code were patterned after these state statutes
and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. The 1951 Ohio statute, in
turn, was tailored from the Code. The forms and procedure pro-
vided for filing under the Code consequently are quite similar to
those now in use in Ohio for accounts receivable assignments.
The forms which are set out in the Ohio statute contain the
same minimal information required by the Code.43 The theory of
notice filing is that the public notice should merely alert the
stranger to his need for further credit information about the as-
signor; and both the Code and the Ohio statute provide procedures
under which the assignor may obtain certain information from the
assignee which will enable the assignor to provide verified credit
data to his present and prospective creditors. The Ohio statute
awards the assignor $500.00 from the assignee if the assignee, after
payment of the debt, in bad faith fails to deliver a notice of cancel-
lation ten days after demand. The Code awards actual damages
incurred by the assignor plus a penalty of $100.00.44 These pro-
visions are designed to prevent a lender from taking a dog-in-the-
manger position when the borrower wishes to do his financing else-
where. The Code also requires the assignee to supply within two
weeks, upon request of the assignor, a statement of unpaid indebt-
edness and to verify a list of assigned accounts. 4s Thus, the Code,
without being unduly onerous on the assignee, 46 meets not only
41 It is sometimes claimed that notice filing makes available to competitors
a list of the secured party's customers. See Dunham, supra, p. 612. A com-
pany which has solicited every borrower revealed by accounts receivable or
factor's lien notices filed in Cuyahoga County has informed the authors that
in no instance has it been successful in persuading the borrower to shift. The
explanation suggested by this unsuccessful solicitor is that the public filing is
usually a final step in an elaborate and carefully negotiated transaction, and
the borrower by then is either too tied or too tired to consider alternatives
no matter how attractive.
42 Ala., Ariz., Calif., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Kan., La., Mo., Neb., N.C.,
Okla., S.C., Texas, Utah and Wash. In addition, Penn. has adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code including its filing provisions, effective July, 1953.
43 OHIo GEN. CODE § 8509-3 (7) and U.C.C. § 9-402 (1).
44 Omo GEN. CoDE § 8509-6a and U.C.C. § 9-404 (1).
45 U.C.C. § 9-208.
46U.C.C. §9-208 requires the assignee to supply such a statement only
once each six months without charge. For additional statements, the assignee
may charge up to $10.00 each.
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the dog-in-the-manger problem but also requires disclosure before
full payment of the debt.
An important difference in the procedures is that the Ohio
statute now requires the filing to be made prior to or contem-
poraneously with the assignment.4 7 The purpose of this require-
ment is to eliminate the practice of holding security documents in
the safe until the debtor becomes shaky and then recording. Gen-
eral creditors are given an earlier warning of liens under this rule,
and, if, through inadvertence, filing has been overlooked and an
assignment taken, the situation can, of course, be remedied (ex-
cept for preference problems which may arise by reason of the
later perfection of the security interest) by filing a notice and then
taking another assignment. The Code permits filing subsequent to
assignment, relying for prompt filing on the fear of the assignee
that various intervening events may worsen the security of an un-
perfected lien,48 and there is considerable logic to this approach of
making the filing time a matter of credit risk for the assignee.
One feature of the filing provisions of the Code which the au-
thors would reject is the Code's provision for state capital filing of
account receivable liens (except for county filing when the accounts
involved arise from the sale of farm products by a farmer) .49 There
are some advantages to a single central file. A set of rules is not
needed to determine the county in which to file.50 Credit informa-
tion services can check one file in Columbus instead of the files in
88 county seats, and the assignee can be certain he has filed in
the proper spot.
Ohio's state capital, however, is neither the financial nor the
industrial center of the state. A telephone call from either Cleve-
land or Cincinnati to a Columbus central file would cost one dollar
even with quite prompt service by the filing office, and use of the
mail would mean three or four days from inquiry to reply. Some
reduction in total consumer lien filings (which are to be made in
47 OHro Gnu. CODE § 8509-5 (1).
48 U.C.C. § 9-303 (1) (a).
49 U.C.C. § 9-401 (a) and (b). For other special treatment of transactions
with farmers see Hunt and Coates, The Impact of the Secured Transactions
Article on Commercial Practices with Respect to Agricultural Financing,
16 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 165 (1951).
5 O See present Ohio rules for selecting proper county in: OHo Gza. CODE
§ 8509-5 (6) (county of principal place of business of assignor of accounts re-
ceivable, or, if no such place in Ohio, then county where assignor keeps ledger
sheet); OHio GEx. CODE § 8364-3 (for factor's lien, county of corporate bor-
rower's principal place of business, or, if no such place in Ohio, then county
where merchandise is located); and Omro GEN. CODE §§ 8561 and 8568 (county
of residence of chattel mortgagor or of conditional vendee, or, if no such place
in Ohio, then county where property is situated.)
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the county of the debtor's residence) is expected under the Code,5 '
but the central file of liens on accounts, inventory and equipment
might get so large as to become unmanageable unless broken down
geographically at least in part, particularly if the new Code pro-
visions increased the popularity of liens on accounts and inventory
as a financing device.52 Several state-wide records are currently
divided into (a) Cuyahoga County, (b) Hamilton County and (c)
the rest of the state, for reasons of geographic and numerical con-
venience in administration,53 and, so far as the theory of central
filing is concerned, there might as well be 88 county files as three
central files.
The Ohio State Bar Association has declined to approve the
filing provisions of the Code,5 4 and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
was never passed in Ohio in part because it provides for central fil-
ing.55 In preparing the 1951 revision of the Ohio Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Act, the merits of central filing were not
weighed because of informed advice that the state legislature, nu-
merically dominated by representatives of the smaller counties,
would not pass an act with such provisions. In existing accounts
receivable legislation, the more important commercial states have
adopted county filing,S6 and in 1951 the California legislature re-
jected a proposal to substitute state capital filing for county filing
under the California statute.
The draftsmen of Article 9 offer a compromise on the central
5 1 Because a purchase money security interest in consumer goods (not part
of real estate and not an automobile) is perfected without filing against all but
a buyer who does not know of the security interest, who gives value, and
who buys for his own personal, family or household purposes. U.C.C. § § 9-
302 (1) (d) and -307 (2).5 2 In Cuyahoga County during an average month the following will be
filed with the Recorder: 7,700 chattel mortgages, 10 conditional sales contracts,
15 notices of assignment of accounts receivable, and I or 2 factor's liens. Ohio
is unique in the large number of consumer goods liens filed, Kripke, The "Se-
cured Transacions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L.
REV. 577, 612 (1949), and a substantial number of the 7,700 chattel mortgages,
being consumer goods liens, would not under the Code be filed in Columbus.
But if only 10% of them from all over Ohio would go into the central file,
that file would soon become unwieldy, particularly because of the duration
of filing provisions of the Code.
53 E.g., form 915 of the Tax Commission, Analysis of a Trust or Life Estate
Income, is filed in Cleveland, Columbus, or Cincinnati.
54 See note 18, supra.
5 5 OHO GN. CODE § 8568 is the Ohio statute covering trust receipts.
56 County filing has been adopted by Ala., Calif., Ga., La., Mich., Neb.,
N.C., Okla., S.C., and Texas. Central filing has been adopted by Ariz., Colo.,
Fla., Idaho, Kan., Mo., Utah and Wash. As this paper is being written, a bill
for central filing is being considered by the Vermont legislature, and bills
for county filing are being considered by the legislatures of Iowa and Wy-
oming.
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filing issue by suggesting as an optional provision that supplemen-
tary county filing be required if all the assignors' places of busi-
ness are in a single county.57 Such duplicate filing would not seem
to be a very happy solution, but Pennsylvania adandoned its tra-
ditional county filing of chattel mortgages and conditional sales
agreements to adopt the Code with this optional feature (which
Pennsylvania previously had adopted for trust receipts). Penn-
sylvania also abandoned bookmarking in favor of notice filing for
assignments of accounts receivable.
Another disputed feature of the Code's filing scheme is its pro-
vision for the duration of the effectiveness of a filing. Article 9 pro-
vides that a filed document remains effective until (a) a time of
termination specified in the filed document; (b) the creditor files
a termination notice; or (c) the filing officer at any time after the
maturity date stated in the notice or after five years from the initial
filing notifies the secured party that the effectiveness of the filed
notice will lapse unless a continuation notice is filed within 60
days.53 The authors feel that the burden of keeping the filing ac-
tive should be on the assignee and that the mechanics for clearing
dead notices from the files should not require the filing officer to
analyze filed documents or to exercise discretion. The three year
duration of filing, subject to cancellation or extension, now used
in Ohio for chattel lien filings 9 suggests a fixed time period which
has proved workable.
The Ohio proponents of the Code should prepare the necessary
supplementary sections to provide county filing and a fixed dura-
tion of effectiveness of filing, or, perhaps, should encourage the
draftsmen of the Code to prepare such provisions for the various
states which may desire them. The need for interstate uniformity
on procedural matters is not great; the important goal of the Code
should be uniformity in substantive law.
RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE
The Ohio statute grants the transferee of an account receivable
the status of "protected" assignee upon completion of a written as-
signinent to him of the account subsequent to or concurrent with
his filing of a notice of assignment. The Code refers to "perfection"
of a security interest in accounts when the notice is filed or when
an assignment for value is made of accounts in which the assignor
has rights, whichever is later.60
The Ohio statute provides "an assignment not so protected shall
57 Bracketed words at end of U.C.C. § 9, 401 (1) (a).
58 U.C.C. § 9-403 (2) and (3).
S9 OHio GEN. CODS § 8565 (chattel mtg.); 8569-1 (Condit. Sales); § 8364-5
(factor's lien); and § 8509-5(a) (a/c receivable).
60 OHIo GEN. CODE § 8509-5 (1), and U.C.C. §§ 9-303 (1) (a) and -204.
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be valid between assignor and assignee but shall be wholly void as
against all other persons." The Code gives the unperfected security
interest somewhat greater rights in that persons who have knowl-
edge of the unperfected security interest cannot prevail over it
even if they perfect their own interest or obtain a lien.61 Although
"1notice of a fact" is carefully defined by the Code so as to exclude
some of the broader concepts of constructive knowledge,62 at this
point the Code establishes a subjective test to benefit a laggard
filer and elsewhere it permits delayed filing.63 The more strict rule
of the Ohio statute would avoid difficult questions to litigate relat-
ing to subjective knowledge, but it might occasionally produce quite
inequitable results. The reasons for choosing either policy seem
less weighty than the desirability of tampering as little as possible
with the substantive sections of the Code.
Under the Ohio statute, an assignee who is "protected" still
takes the account subject to certain liens which might be on the
account and to certain rights of tracing proceedings to which the
assignor might have been subject.64 In Ohio such liens on an ac-
count might include: an effective attachment by a third party of
the sum owing to the assignor if the attachment preceded the as-
signment of the account; or, unpaid franchise and personal property
taxes of a corporation which assigned the account at the time of
its dissolution.65 There is no Code provision which expressly recog-
nizes these superior claims but it is perhaps implicit. 66
The rights of the assignee who "protects" under the Ohio statute
are substantially the same as those of the assignee who "perfects"
under the Code. There are five classifications of persons against
whom such rights might be asserted:
(1) The assignor
(2) The assignor's creditors
(3) The assignor's transferees
(4) The Trustee in Bankruptcy of the assignor
(5) The assignor's debtors
The principal differences between the Code and the Ohio statute
relate not to the unpaid balance of the assigned account but as to
"proceeds" collected by the assignor.6 7
(1) The assignor. Between assignor and assignee, subject only
to restrictions in any contract between them, the assignee under
61 Osio GEN. CODE § 8509-6 (1) and U.C.C. § 9-301 (1) (b).
62 U.C.C. § 1-201(25), (26) and (27).
63 See discussion of this under Filing Provisions, p.-.
64 Ono Gssx. CoDE § 8509-6(a) and (3).
65s Omo Gm. CODE § 5506.
66 One would expect to find such a provision in U.C.C. § 9-303(2), and
perhaps § 9-303 (2) (e) or § 9-201 implies it.
67 Defined at OQao GEx. CODE § 85-9-3(9) and at U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
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either the Code or the Ohio statute has superior rights to the as-
signed accounts and to any proceeds.68
(2) The assignor's creditors. Against the assignor's creditors,
the assignee under either the Code or the Ohio statute prevails as
to the unpaid account balance.69 This is true even if the assignee
has permitted the assignor to collect the proceeds of the assigned
accounts and to use them freely in the assignor's business. The
contrary rule of Benedict v. Ratner" has been reversed by both
the Ohio statute and the Code.71 Lenders, of course, may still police
the collection practices of borrowers, but the extent and the nature
of the policing will be a matter of credit policy rather than of legal
necessity. The wisdom of abolishing the Benedict v. Ratner rule
has been debated, 72 but where notice filing is required most argu-
ments against such abolition are weakened.73 In any event, Ohio
in 1941 abolished the rule in part in connection with account re-
ceivable assignments and in 1951 wholly abolished it in that con-
nection. The Code in this regard is not an innovation.
Under the Ohio statute the assignee also has a right superior
to the assignor's general creditors in any proceeds collected but not
yet turned over to the assignee. Such proceeds, however, are not
regarded as trust funds unless the assignee contracts with the as-
signor in such fashion as to impose a fiduciary status upon the as-
signor and further requires an appropriate segregation of the col-
lected funds. Under the Code a similar fiduciary status may be im-
posed by contract or a security interest by filed notice may be at-
tached to the proceeds. Even without such arrangements, under
the Code a secured party with a perfected security interest in the
accounts has a claim preferred over the general creditors to the as-
signor's cash and bank accounts equal to the cash proceeds col-
lected by the assignor during the immediately preceding ten days
68 Owo Gmz. CoDE § 8509-6(5) and U.C.C. § 9-201. In Brod v. Cincinnati
Time Recorder, 82 Ohio App. 26, 77 N.E. 2d 293 (1947) the assignor was al-
lowed to retain as against the assignee payments made to the assignor by a
bonding company to cover defalcations of the assignor's collection agent prior
to the assignment without warranty. Query: whether such payments are
"proceeds" under either the Ohio statute or the Code.
6 9 Omo GEN. CODE § 8509-6(5) and U.C.C. § 9-201.
70 See note 13, supra.
71 Omo GEN. CODE § 8509-6b and U.C.C. § 9-205.
7 2 Kripke, The Modernizatkn of Commercial Security Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CoNmn'. PRos. 183 (1951) (leads to competition
between lenders "upon the basis of a competitive debasement of proper col-
lateral control practices".) But compare Gilmore, The Secured Transactions
Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAw & Coemn. PnoB. 27, 36 ff. (1951).
73 Cf. Second Nt. Bank of Houston v. Phillips, 189 F. 2d 115 (5th Cir. 1951).
See Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 35 VA. L. Rav. 577, 591-2 (1949).
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minus any portion of such proceeds already paid to the assignee.74
The Code here seems to be unduly generous to the assignee. To
the extent that the assignee dilutes his contractual control over
the proceeds, to that extent he should reduce the priority of his
claim to the proceeds over the claims of the general creditors. The
Code, however, is less generous to the non-policing assignee than
was the 1941 Ohio statute which, like the present statutes of many
states, made the assignor a trustee of the proceeds by statute and
limited the right of the assignee only by his ability to trace.
(3) The assignor's transferees. Where -wo assignees of the
same account have each duly filed the statutory notice, under both
the Code and the Ohio statute, priority as to the unpaid balance
of the account is given to the first who filed a notice.75 This per-
mits a revolving assignment arrangement whereby a line of credit
is kept open against successive assignments of accounts; a fixed
total of security is maintained by regular assignment of fresh ac-
counts to replace those which have been paid. A fixed total loan
is maintained since the assignee lends back against the new accounts
the moneys he collected on the old ones. Once the assignee has
checked the filed notices and determined that his is the earliest
notice on file, he need not again check the public records as he
takes each subsequent assignment. No one subsequently filing a
notice can prevail even if the later one to file has obtained an
earlier written assignment. In such revolving arrangements, the as-
signee must be sure, however, that the new assignments precede the
relending of the collections; otherwise the assignment would be
for antecedent consideration and possibly a preference.7 6
When present assignment of future accounts is possible, such a
revolving arrangement can become a floating lien.77 Thus the Ohio
statute permits the present assignment of future accounts which
may arise under existing contracts. 78 A manufacturer who has con-
74 Omo Gmx. CoDE § 8509-6(5) and U.C.C. § 9-306.
75 OHIO GEN. CODE § 8509-6(4) and U.C.C. § 9-312.
76 For a more detailed description of a revolving assignment of accounts
receivable see Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62
HAnv. L. REv. 588, 596 (1949).
77 The term is derived from the English "floating charge". The Companies
Act, 1929, 19 and 20 GEO. V, c. 23 § 266 permits a term loan to be secured by
a lien on existing and after-acquired inventory. The borrower agrees to main-
tain a minimum ratio of inventory value to loan balance, but may otherwise
buy for and sell from inventory without restriction. See Dunham, supra,
p. 595, and discussion of this "sophisticated concept" by Magruder, J., in Man-
chester Nt. Bank v. Roche, 186 F. 2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951).
78 The definition in Omo GEr. CoDe § 8509-3(1) of an account receivable
includes "a right to payment which may arise under an existing contract" and
the design of the statute makes such an account receivable presently assign-
able. To avoid the bankruptcy preference problem, the assignment papers
should be drafted so that the transaction will be analyzed as a contempo-
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tracts ("franchises") with his dealers may thus pledge to the bank
as security for a term loan his future accounts receivable from speci-
fied dealers. He need not assign each invoice as goods are shipped
nor turn over payments as received.79 The bank for credit control
would probably want a regular report on dropped dealers, current
balances, etc., but the law does not require the lender to police his
loan. Upon default, the bank's lien would apply to such balances
as were due from the specified dealers at the time of foreclosure.
The Code, which does not limit the present assignment of accounts
only to those which may arise under existing contracts, broadens
considerably the possible uses of such floating liens. U.C.C. Secs.
9-204 (2) (c) and (d) and 9-108 (2) make it possible for a depart-
ment store, for example, to give a bank a floating lien on its book
accounts even though its accounts arise from individual sales to
customers, who have no contract with the store at the time the
floating lien is established. The desirability of such enlarged use of
floating liens has already been discussed.
If the assignor transfers the proceeds to someone other than
a good faith purchaser for value of goods or the holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument, the assignee protected under the
Ohio statute may recover the proceeds - but a special short statute
of limitations requires him to undertake such recovery within one
year after the proceeds are paid by or for the account of debtor.8 0
Under the Code, unless insolvency proceedings have been instituted
against the assignor, the perfected security interest continues in
identifiable proceeds, but if the proceeds are transferred by the as-
signor in the ordinary course of business, the assignee will in most
cases be unable to capture the proceeds. 81 Thus, except for the ac-
celerated statute of limitations, the Code and the Ohio statute grant
substantially the same rights to the assignee against transferees of
the proceeds of assigned accounts.
(4) The assignor's Bankruptcy Trustee. Under the revised
Bankruptcy Act Section 60, the trustee in bankruptcy has the same
status as a lien creditor.8 2 He, therefore, prevails over an unpro-
raneous exchange of the initial loan for an immediate assignment of the claims
which may arise. If the assignment is analyzed as not occurring until the claim
actually does arise, the transfer is for an antecedent debt. U.C.C. § 9-108
(2) expressly states the first analysis, which is implicit in the Ohio statute.
For the danger of establishing a floating lien where the law does not clearly
permit its use see In re Standard Const. Co. Inc., 92 Fed. Supp. 838 (D.C. N.H.
1950), af'd sub nom. Manchester Nat. Bank v. Roche, 186 F. 2d 827 (1st Cir.
1951).
7 9 The retention of collections by the assignor without thereby impairing
the security interest of the assignee is made possible by the abolition of the
rule of Benedict v. Ratner. See discussion infra at p. 87.
8 0 Omo Gen. CoDE § 8509-6(5).
81 U.C.C. §§ 9-306 (4), -307, -308 and -309.
82 See note 22, supra.
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tected assignee under the Ohio statute or an unperfected security
interest under the Code but is subordinated in the event of pro-
tection or perfection. The difference between the Code and the
Ohio statute is the Code's special 10-day rule as to proceeds com-
pared with tracing under the Ohio statute.8 3
(5) The assignor's debtors. There are no major differences
between the Code and the Ohio statute in the rights of the account
debtor whose account has been assigned. Under both, the assignee
is subject to defenses and claims of the account debtor arising out
of the contract between him and the assignor and also the defenses
and claims which accrue before the account debtor receives notice
that his debt has been assigned.S4 The Ohio statute makes explicit
the right of the account debtor to assert "any set-off or defense aris-
ing from a breach of warranty not discovered until the account
debtor has received . . . (the statutory notice) . . . to the extent
of the balance of the account receivable unpaid when the breach is
discovered," and the same rule is adopted by the Code. This is
an important right for credit purchasers of complex mechanical
items (automobiles, television sets or refrigerators) or services the
quality of which cannot be judged until sometime after purchase
(roof repairs, furnace rebuilding, etc.). Non-payment is often the
purchaser's only practicable means of compelling service and re-
pair, and the assignee is often in a better position to investigate a
dealer in advance and to compel him to treat the customer fairly.
The Code recognizes yet another aspect of this problem by in-
validating agreements by a consumer not to assert claims and de-
fenses arising out of his purchase.8 5
The Code also invalidates prohibitions of assignment by account
debtors. This would reverse the probable Ohio rule as gleaned from
a nineteenth century case, but would conform to a current shift
in general legal thought and current commercial practice.86 The ac-
count debtor, despite notice of assignment, may under the Code con-
tinue to make his payments to his original creditor until supplied
with reasonable proof of the assignee's rights.8 7 Another innova-
83 See note 74, supra.
84 OHio Gmw. CODE § 8509-6c and U.C.C. §§ 9-317, 318 (1) (a) and (b).
The Ohio statute requires that the notice be written and "state the amount
claimed to be due the protected assignee and identify the transactions from
which the assigned account receivable arose." But the account debtor who
learns of the assignment in some less formal way than the statutory notice
cannot subject the assignee to any and all payments to or settlements with the
assignor made thereafter, for the statute provides that the assignee shall be
subject only to good faith dealings of the account debtor prior to formal notice.
85 U.C.C. § 9-206 (1). See discussion on p. 86.
86 Compare U.C.C. § 9-318 (4) and official comments thereto with United
States Life Ins. Co. v. Hessberg, 27 Ohio St. 393 (1875) and Allhussen v. Caristo
Const. Co., 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E. 2d 891 (1952).
87 U.C.C. § 9-318 (4).
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tion in the Code is provision for the amendment of a contract after
notice has been given of the assignment of money to become due
under it. The contract may be modified to the extent not completed
by the assignor and the debtor-to-be if the changes are "made in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial stand-
ards." The assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modi-
fied contract and, if the assignment so provides, may regard the
modification as a breach by the assignor.88 This will be a very use-
ful rule if the device of floating liens becomes more common, and
the assignee who wishes to avoid it can always so contract with the
debtor-to-be at the time of the assignment.
PROCEDURE UPON DEFAULT
The Ohio statute does not expressly cover the rights of the as-
signor upon default by the assignee. The Code concisely spells out
an appropriate procedure. When the assignor defaults, the assignee
under the Code may notify the account debtors to pay the assignee
directly even if previously they have been paying the assignor and
have not known of the assignment.8 9 If the assignment was with
partial or full recourse, the assignee must make such collections "in
a commercially reasonable manner" and may deduct his reasonable
expenses of collection. Whether the assignor is entitled to a surplus
or liable for a deficit if there was no express agreement upon the
point depends upon whether the assignment was to secure a loan
or was actually a sale.90
CHATTEL PAPER
Chattel paper is defined in U.C.C. Sec. 9-105 (1) (b) as "a se-
curity agreement or lease of a type which is in ordinary course of
business transferred by delivery with appropriate indorsement or
assignment. When a transaction is evidenced both by chattel paper
and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writ-
ings taken together constitutes chattel paper." The intention is to
include chattel mortgages, conditional sales agreements, bailment
leases and any other writings which (a) create liens on personal
property and (b) are ordinarily transferred by indorsement and
delivery. The final sentence of the definition makes the law of
chattel paper assignments rather than the law of negotiable instru-
ments applicable to the indorsee of a promissory note which arose
from a transaction where a chattel mortgage or conditional sales
agreement was also executed. (Note indication of this on mustra-
tion "A"). U.C.C. § 9-206 voids an agreement by a buyer of con-
sumer goods not to assert against assignees defenses and claims
88U.C.C. § 9-318 (2).
89TU.C.C. § 9-502 (1).
90U.C.C. § 9-502 (2).
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arising out of the sale, even if asserted by the holder in due course
of a negotiable note. 91
These limitations of the traditional status of a holder in due
course reflect a current trend in case law to deny that status, on
almost any convenient rationalization, to finance companies or banks
regularly discounting a dealer's consumer chattel paper.9 2 In Ohio,
for example, a finance company was held liable to a house owner,
in an action based on alleged conspiracy to Jfefraud, when the court
concluded that the finance company should have known that its
assignor as consideration for the making of the assigned notes was
doing an inferior job of house siding application. In denying the
finance company the status of a holder in due course the Ohio
court quoted with approval the headnote of an Arkansas case:
A finance company which had prepared and delivered
to an automobile dealer forms of notes and conditional
sales contracts bearing a printed form of assignment to it-
self, and which, on the day of the sale of a car by the dealer,
took an assignment of the sales contract and purchaser's
note, is to be regarded as a party to the transaction against
whom the defense of fraud and misrepresentation may be
made rather than as an innocent purchaser for value before
maturity.93
The rule suggested in the above head note is more strict than Article
9 of the Code, for that Article does not take the position that a bank
or finance company regularly discounting a dealer's paper can never
for any purpose be a holder in due course of that paper.94 In its
treatment of holders of notes secured by chattel paper arising from
sales of consumer goods, then, Article 9 would supersede a few
old Ohio cases which gave such holders the normal rights of in-
dorsees of negotiable paper 9s but would take a middle of the road
91 If the holder in due course of the note does not attempt to foreclose un-
der the security agreement or to levy on the collateral, he is not automatically
subject to the defenses. U.C.C. § 9-206 (1). He could, for example, get a
money judgment and attach the debtor's wages.
92 See 152 AJ.R. 1397 (1944).
93 Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 318 (Stark Cty.
1950).
94 U.C.C. § 3-302, which defines "holder in due course" in the Article cov-
ering Commercial Paper, requires not only good faith but "observance of
the reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the holder
may be engaged" and lack of notice "of any defense against . .. it." U.C.C.
§ 1-201 (25) (c) states that a person has notice of a fact when "from all the
facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason
to know it exists". So a bank or finance company regularly discounting paper
of an unsatisfactory dealer might become subject to defenses wholly apart from
Article 9.
9S See, e.g. Springfield Loan Co. v. Nat Guarantee & Finance Co., 30 Ohio
L. Abs. 582; (1939); Dennis v. Rotter, 43 Ohio App. 330 (1932); and Gates v.
Merchant's Banking & Storage Co., 11 Ohio C.D. 721, 22 Ohio C.C.R. 724 (1901).
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position in what appears to be the current trend in Ohio case law
and the case law of other states.
There is a similar current trend in the case law to void clauses
in consumer goods purchase agreements which waive or cut off
against an assignee of chattel paper defenses such as breach of
warranty and failure to carry out service agreements. 9 6 Thus the
sixth circuit Court of Appeals voided a broad waiver as being
against public policy, relying not on applicable state law but on
"the established law merchant. '97 The Code again, then, would
merely codify a trend in judicial opinion which Ohio would prob-
ably recognize in any event.
These code provisions have been vigorously criticized on
grounds of logic and policy,98 but, as a practical matter, neither the
negotiable note nor the waiver and cut-off clause is of much im-
portance in financing consumer transactions. Field interviews have
established that the larger finance companies as a rule either do
not now use these provisions in their standard forms, or, if the
standard forms do contain such provisions, the companies seldom
try to invoke the rights which the Code, if adopted, would deny
them. Typically the bank or finance company tries to get the
assignor-dealer to make good on his promises to the consumer or
else charges such losses to the dealer's "reserve," a fund with-
held from the initial financing for various contingent charges. 99
We now turn to the transfer of chattel paper. Neither the pres-
ent Ohio chattel mortgage statute nor the present Ohio condi-
tional sales statute contains any provision covering the assignment
of chattel paper,100 and there is very little Ohio case law on the
subject. It has been established that the rights of a chattel mort-
gagee can be transferred,' 0 ' that an assignment of chattel paper
is not itself required to be filed or recorded,10 2 and that an assignee
of a conditional sales contract is subject to the refund provisions
of the conditional sales statute.10 3
96 Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16
LAw & CoTrmp'. PROB. 27, 46 (1951).
9 7 Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F. 2d 442
(6th Cir. 1941).
98 Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under The Uniform
Commercial Code, 59 YAIm L.J. 1209, 1214 ff. (1950).
99 Kripke, supra, 1216; Note- Negotiability of Conditional Sales Contracts,
57 YALE L.J. 1414, 1418 (1948).
100 Except that a chattel mortgage which has been recorded (because it
covers land and chattels) may be assigned in the same manner as a real estate
mortgage. OQio GEN. CODE § 8563.
101 Johnson v. Thayer, 53 Ohio App. 25, 4 N.E. 2d 172 (1936); Frey v. Mac-
Wilson, 39 Ohio App. 158, 177 N.E. 232 (1931).
102 Nathan Rosenblum & Co. v. C. U. Hill & Co., Z7 Ohio L. Abs. 403, 405
(7th Dist. App. Mahoning County 1938).
103 Yurcisin v. Commercial Credit Co., 67 Ohio App. 513 (1941).
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There was no comprehensive treatment of the problem, how-
ever, until the 1951 Accounts Receivable Statute included in its
definition of an account receivable any account evidenced by un-
filed chattel mortgages and unfiled conditional sales agreements. 10 4
Thus chattel paper not of public record (which comprises the great
majority of all chattel paper arising in the sale of consumer
goods) 105 came under the notice filing requirements already dis-
cussed in this paper as the exclusive way in which a security in-
terest could be perfected.10 6 But the transfer of accounts evidenced
by filed chattel mortgages and filed conditional sales agreements
remains covered by only the fragmentary legal rules discussed
above.
The Uniform Commercial Code establishes a comprehensive
scheme for the assignment of all chattel paper. First of all, it recog-
nizes that existing commercial practice is to transfer chattel paper
by delivery of possession, but it also recognizes a security interest
which can be perfected by filing without transfer of possession.10 7
Thus the Code provides for the many assignors (especially those
who do not notify their debtors of the assignment and who collect
the installment proceeds) for whom it is not convenient to trans-
fer the chattel paper, by providing that notice filing shall perfect
a security interest in chattel paper left in the possession of the
assignor. Such perfection, however, will not prevail against, a pur-
chaser for new value who takes possessionlOS By stamping a
notice of assignment on the chattel paper left in the possession of
the assignor, the assignee can prevent a purchaser from gaining
this preferred position since any purchaser would necessarily learn
from such stamp that the chattel paper had been previously as-
signed, and U.C.C. Sec. 9-308 gives the purchaser for new value a
preferred position only if he "does not have actual knowledge that
the specific chattel paper is subject to a security interest." These
provisions for perfection by possession come closer to existing com-
mercial practice and expectation of legal result than does the pres-
ent Ohio Statute as is shown by the fact that the Ohio statute's
provisions governing unfiled chattel paper have thus far been
largely ignored.
SUAMAxY AND CONCLUSION
Account receivable and chattel paper financing has become,
in terms of dollar volume and yet more in terms of number of
104 Oiuo GEN. CODE § 8509-3 (1) (b) (3).
105 Most small loan companies and credit stores regard the saving of the
Recorder's fee as an ample reserve for the occasional loss due to dishonesty
or bankruptcy of the individual borrower or customers. But cf. note supra.
106See Omo GEN. CODE § 8509-4 and -6(1).
107U.C.C. § 9-305(1).
108 U.C.C. § 9-308.
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transactions, a major source of commercial and industrial borrow-
ing.10 9 Ohio was one of the first states to provide a legal frame-
work for such financing and, except for filed chattel paper, it al-
ready has legislated a legal pattern which overall is about the
same as the legal pattern in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Code's provisions covering security interests in ac-
counts, contract rights, and chattel paper, however, (a) are inte-
grated into the provisions covering security interests in documents,
instruments, and goods, and (b) have been adopted by Pennsyl-
vania and will be adopted by many other states. This uniformity
between types of security interests and between the laws of the
several states is of sufficient importance to justify substituting the
Code for the present Ohio law.
On a policy level, the principal objection to Article 9 is that
by facilitating current asset financing the legislature may dis-
courage trade suppliers from offering generous credit terms. Since
it is smaller businesses in particular which typically use trade
credit from their suppliers as a primary source of outside capital,"0
the objection is sometimes carried further to a statement that the
modernization of chattel security law will aid banks, finance com-
panies, and big business at the expense of small companies.
The Code's draftsmen are not economists enough to trace the
ultimate economic impact of their proposals -indeed, one of the
draftsmen has suggested that not even the professional economists
are economists enough for that.11' But extreme predictions of
various forms of disaster were also made in 1941 when the pioneer
Ohio Assignment of Accounts Receivable Statute was passed, and
all that has actually happened is that lower cost financing has
gradually become available to those companies which need credit
and can offer accounts receivable as collateral. Compared to this
accounts receivable financing now available, trade credit through
the loss of cash discounts on purchases is very expensive financ-
ing.1 12 Perhaps the economic cost of distribution will be less if it
is financed by secured borrowing on inventory and accounts
rather than by undiscounted invoices for purchases. In any event,
1 9 An economic history of accounts receivable financing will be found in
Sauliner & Jacobs, Accounts Receivable Financing, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (1943). The commercial and financial aspects, with case il-
lustrations, are considered in Silbert, Financing and Factoring Accounts Re-
ceivable, 30 HAsv. Busxss REv. 39 (1952).
110Kripke, Current Assets Financing As a Source of Long-Term Capital,
36 M1w. L. REV. 506, 507 (1952).
11 1 Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code,
116 LAw & CoNsmvp. PRoB. 27 (1951).
112 Losing a "2/10 net 30" cash discount means paying 2% for 20 days use
of the money or a per annum interest rate of 36%%.
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that economic puzzle is not an issue in evaluating Article 9, for
we do not face the choice of permitting or forbidding borrowing
on current assets. Our choice is whether such borrowing, which
has grown enormously during the twentieth century and which is
still growing, shall be carried on under the law of the twentieth
century or under the law of the preceding century.
One might agree with all we have just said as to policy and
still feel that the form and the substance of each section of Article
9 should be reviewed with an eye to tailoring the Article more
closely to Ohio practices and precedents and, possibly, to im-
proving on the style of the draftsmen. We have suggested that
changes might be desirable in connection with the coverage of
claims against the Federal Government and with the filing pro-
visions. But Article 9 is an interrelated and c o m p 1 e x statute;
wholly unexpected consequences may ensue from seemingly minor
changes in the key sections. Amendments to the Article, there-
fore, should be carefully drafted well in advance of the legisla-
tive session and should be reviewed by experts on the Code. Then
every effort should be made to persuade the legislature to do no
hasty tinkering.
Only for very good reasons should any change be made in the
official text. Judge Goodrich, director of the American Law In-
stitute, has pretty well stated the case for Article 9 in stating the
case for the entire Code:
All matters contained in the Code will not be satis-
factory to all as a matter of substance. Many matters ex-
pressed in text or commentary will not be satisfactory to
some. After all, a man who can write, if he has any pride
of authorshfp, likes his own form of expression best.
But we think that the Code itself represents the sum
total of an immense amount of time and thought from a
great many people well informed in both the business and
the legal sides of the fields covered by the Code.
We hope it will perform a public service worthy of
the effort which has gone into it.113
113 Foreword to Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition (1952)
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